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HOW STRONG IS YOUR AMERICAN BLOOD?
Mary-Anne is from a small province in the Philippines and is
attendinguniversity on scholarship. Mary-Anne is dating the love of her life,
Joe, an American businessman currently assigned to the Philippines. With
only afew years left to finish her degree, Mary-Anne is excited for what the
future will hold for her and Joe. Then suddenly Mary-Anne's whole world
changed. Joe is reassignedback to the states and despite his promises to
return, Mary-Anne is unable to contact him. Mary-Anne soon finds out that
she is pregnantand tries tirelessly to connect with Joe but he does not reply
to any of her messages or letters. Unable to keep up with her classes while
working, Mary-Anne loses her scholarship and is no longer able to afford
tuition. Mary-Anne is forced to return to herprovince where she works in a
ricefield while her baby, Richard, stays with Mary-Anne's family.
Mary-Anne is struggling to providefor Richard. Like any parent,
Mary-Anne wants Richard to live a better life than her. Mary-Anne knows
that life in America would open a whole new world of opportunitiesfor
Richard. Mary-Anne scrounges up enough money to submit a United States
passport application on behalf of Richard. After waiting several months,
Mary-Anne is notified that Richard's application is denied because Joe is
not recognized as Richard'sfather. Therefore, Richard is unable to claim
United States citizenship. If the roles were reversed and Mary-Anne was an
American assigned to the Philippines while Joe was a Filipino national,
Richard would have United States citizenshipfrom the date of his birth, no
questions asked.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has recognized the same constitutional
protections to children born out of wedlock as those born in wedlock.'

1 See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977) ("[W]e have expressly considered and
rejected the argument that a State may attempt to influence the actions of men and women by
imposing sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate relationships."); Jimenez v.
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 632 (1974) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S.
691, 175-76 (1972)) (highlighting injustice of penalizing children for parent's actions); Gomez v.
Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) ("[A] State may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate
children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally."); CitizenshipChildren Born Out of Wedlock of American Fathers & Alien Mothers, 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 162, 164
(1920) (recognizing "rights of an illegitimate child."). The Supreme Court has recognized that the
Equal Protection Clause is violated by discriminatory laws relating to the status of birth where
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However, the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), which governs
immigration and naturalization in the United States and has been codified by
Congress, continues to make the distinction between children born abroad to
married and unmarried parents with only one United States citizen parent in
determining citizenship.2 Congress has long established that children born
within United States territory obtain citizenship regardless of the status of
their parents.3 While the statute governing birth-right citizenship does not
specify the relationship of the parent or defines what the term parent means,
a later statute titled "Children Born Out of Wedlock" indicates that
lawmakers intended the requirement for birth-right citizenship apply only to
children born of married parents.' The Supreme Court has not supported

classification has no legitimate state interest. See Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 632 (quoting Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 169, 175-76 (1972)).
2 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)-(c) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-117) (identifying standard
for foreign born children born out of wedlock to one citizen parent), with 8 U.S.C. § 1401(d)
(LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-82) (identifying foreign born individuals may claim United States
citizenship at time of birth). Specifically, Congress permitted married parents to transmit
citizenship to:

.

[A] person born outside of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one
of whom is a citizen of the United States who has been physically present in the United
States or outlying possession . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1401(d) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-82); see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420,
421 (1998) (justifying necessity of having two standards depending on how many parents are
citizens); Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 312 (1961) (distinguishing standards for transmitting
citizenship when both parents or only one is a citizen). However, foreign born children born to
unmarried parents must establish their relationship to their U.S. citizen parent with a different
standard to claim birth right citizenship. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)-(c) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No.
115-117).
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside."); 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006) (considering person born in U.S. and subject to its jurisdiction as
U.S. citizen at birth); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898) (distinguishing
being born in United States and being subject to jurisdiction of the United States). Wong Kim Ark
was born in the Unites States to parents of Chinese descent who were residents of the United States
but still considered "subjects of the Emperor of China" at the time of Wong Kim Ark's birth. Id. at
652. Wong Kim Ark left the United States with every intention of returning, but was denied entry
on "the sole ground that he was not a citizen of the United States." Id. at 653. The Supreme Court
recognized the historical background behind the Fourteenth Amendment and the foundational
requirement of the U.S. legal system in requiring a child born, like Wong Kim Ark, to acquire
United States citizenship at birth. Id. at 693-94.
4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No 115-117) (defining birth-right citizenship
for child born abroad to one United States citizen married parent); 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)-(c) (LEXIS
through Pub. L. No. 115-117) (implying children born to married parents treated differently than
those born to unmarried parents); 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (LEXIS Pub. L. No. 115-117) (providing
definitions for terms within statute). Congress determined that birth-right citizenship is acquired
when:
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gender neutral constitutional protections in a citizens ability to transmit
citizenship to a child born abroad out of wedlock.' The Supreme Court

(g) a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying
possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United
States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States
or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than five years, at least
two of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years ...
8 USC § 1401(g); see also Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801, 805 (9th Cir. 1995) and cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1043 (1996) (explaining necessity of legitimizing). The court determined that establishing
paternity is required because:
In the case of legitimate children, most states make a presumption of paternity
(rebuttable or otherwise) that determines the husband to be the child's legal father. When
children are born out of wedlock, there is no such presumption, and the Government
naturally requires proof of paternity before determining someone to be the legal father.
Ablang, 52 F.3d at 805 (alteration in original).
s See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-117) (explaining requirements to
transmit citizenship from citizen mother to child born abroad out of wedlock). The statute provides:
[A] person born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and out of wedlock
shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, if the mother
had the nationality of the United States at the time of such person's birth, and if the
mother had previously been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying
possessions for a continuous period of one year.
Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(l)-(4) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-117) (explaining requirements to
transmit citizenship from citizen father to child born abroad out of wedlock). Specifically,
(a) The provisions of paragraphs (c), (d), (e), and (g) of section 301 [8 USCS §1401(c)(e), (g)], and of paragraph (2) of section 308 [8 USCS § 1408(2)], shall apply as of the
date of birth of a person born out of wedlock if1) [A] blood relationship between the person and the father is established by clear
and convincing evidence,
2) [T]he father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the person's
birth,
3) [T]he father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial support
for the person until the person reaches the age of 18 years, and
4) [W]hile the person is under the age of 18 yearsA. the person is legitimated under the law of the person's residence or
domicile,
B. the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath,
or
C. the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a
competent court.
Id. The Court has previously recognized that the application of different requirements for mothers
and fathers "is neither surprising nor troublesome." See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001)
(citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,439 (1985) and F.S. Royster Guano
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recently addressed the issue of whether the statute governing the
transmission of citizenship to a child born abroad to a United States citizen
father and non-citizen mother violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.6
This Note will explore the purpose of Congress' distinction in the
transmission of citizenship to children born abroad to unmarried parents
when only one parent is a United States citizen, and the history of such
legislation.' Next, this Note will examine the Supreme Courts analysis of
the Equal Protection Clause in Morales-Santana.' This Note will then argue
that the Supreme Court properly upheld the judgment of the Second Circuit
in its finding that 8 U.S.C. §1409(a) and (c) violated the Fifth Amendment
guarantee of equal protection.9 Ultimately, the Note will argue in favor of
establishing requirements for birth-right citizenship children to receive the
same treatment regardless of which parent holds United States citizenship. 0
H. HISTORY
The Fourteenth Amendment established citizenship for all those
"born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction" of
the United States." However, transfer of citizenship when a child is born
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)) (noting gender specific terms mark permissible
constitutional distinction); see also Miller, 523 U.S. at 445 ("[Bliological differences . . .provide a
relevant basis for differing rules governing their ability to confer citizenship on children born [out
of wedlock] in foreign lands.").
6 See Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 521 (2d Cir. 2015), aff d in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3724, at *37-38 (June 12,2017)
(deeming gender-based distinction violation of equal protection and requiring uniform treatment).
7 See infra Part II.
8 See infra Part Ill.
9 See infra Part IV.
10 See infra Part IV.
" See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress power to "establish a uniform rule of
naturalization"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (creating general definition of citizenship); see also
Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 828-29 (1971) (acknowledging citizenship was referenced but
originally undefined in Constitution); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) ("hold[ing] that
the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this Nation against
a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race.").
Compare United States v. Wong Ark Kim, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898) (establishing citizenship at
birth if born within territory, even with non-citizen parents) and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 369 (1886) (establishing protection of non-citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment within U.S.
territory) with Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 543 (1895) (construing Nishimura
Ekiku v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892)) ("[E]very sovereign nation has the power,
inherent in sovereignty and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within
its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to
prescribe . . . ."), Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,713 (1893) ("The power to exclude
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outside the continental United States and its territories is exclusively defined
by statute.1 2 The standard for transmitting citizenship becomes more
complicated when American citizens have children abroad because courts
and legislators have historically treated children of American citizens born
abroad differently in terms of how to transmit citizenship." Even before the
or to expel aliens ... is vested in the political department of the government, and is to be regulated
by treaty or by act of congress, and to be executed by the executive authority according to the
regulations .... ), and Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889) (recognizing
government has unfettered authority to exclude non-citizens from American territory). The
Supreme Court recognized that the language of the Fourteenth Amendment and the legislation that
gave birth to the Fourteenth Amendment intended to apply to all those seeking the protection of the
court system regardless of citizenship. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369. In Chae Chan Ping, also
known as The Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court considered what the federal government could
do regarding immigration under the Constitution. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604. The Court
acknowledged the federal government's authority to regulate immigration based on "national
security, sovereignty over its own territory, and self-preservation." See Hiroshi Motomura,
ImmigrationLaw After a Century of Plenary Power:Phantom ConstitutionalNorms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE LJ. 545, 551-52 (1990) (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581, 604 (1889)). The Chae Chan Ping Court specifically noted that:
The power of the government to exclude foreigners from the country whenever, in its
judgment, the public interests require such exclusion, has been asserted in repeated
instances, and never denied by the executive or legislative departments.
Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606-607.
12 See 8 USC § 1401(g) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No 115-117) (outlining requirements to
transmit birth-right citizenship when only one parent is U.S. citizen); 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) and (c)
(LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-117) (defining requirements for transmission of citizenship for
children born abroad out of wedlock); see also LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
To BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 43 (1998) ("Courts have held that
there is no implicit constitutional right to transmit citizenship to one's children; the transmission is
guided by specific legislation.").
13 See Wauchope v. U.S. Dept. of State, 985 F2d 1407, 1414 (9th Cir. 1993) (alteration in
original) (applying easier standard while recognizing "a more traditional (and hence more rigorous)
standard of scrutiny" of statutes). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that § 1993 of
the Revised Statutes of 1874 which only allowed United States citizen fathers to transmit
citizenship to foreign born children and not United States citizen mothers is unconstitutional. Id. at
1418. In Wauchope, the court recognized that a higher level of scrutiny was required to review the
legislation should have been reviewed with a higher level of scrutiny if not for Congress's plenary
power over immigration. Id. at 1414. However, the court found even in applying the facially
legitimate standard, the statute determining birth-right citizenship was unconstitutional. Id. at 1418;
see also Thomas Aleinikoff ET AL., IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS & POLICY, 8 (5th ed.
2003) (recognizing inconsistent legislation and application of amended statutes). See,e.g.,
Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,79-80 (1976) ("In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization
and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to
citizens."); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972) ("[P]lenary congressional power
to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been firmly established."); Boutilier v.
INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967) (reaffirming Congressional "plenary power to make rules for the
admission of aliens" and exclusion); see also Martha F. Davis, Sex-Based Citizenship
Classificationsand the "New Rationality," 80 ALB. L. REv. 851, 856 (2017) ("The plenary power
doctrine argues for judicial deference to congressional and executive decision-making in the area

270

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XXII

formal adoption of birth-right citizenship into the Constitution, Congress
extended citizenship to children born outside United States territory.1 4 To
this day, the basis of the statute regulating birth-right citizenship, jus
sanguinis, is the gender of the citizenship holder when a child is born to
unmarried parents despite several revisions to the statute.15 For much of

of immigration insofar as it is an aspect of foreign affairs; the questions of whether that deference
extends beyond immigration to citizenship laws has never been resolved."); Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom ConstitutionalNorms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE LJ. 545, 547 (1990) ("The plenary power doctrine's contours have
changed over the years, but in general the doctrine declares that Congress and the executive branch
have broad and exclusive authority over immigration decisions.").
14 See Naturalization Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795)
(establishing paternal ties to U.S. for transmission of citizenship to children born abroad). Congress
specified that:
[C]hildren of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the
limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens: Provided, That
the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never been
resident of the United States ....
Id.; Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 667 (1927) (noting parents need to establish citizenship
prior to birth of child to transmit citizenship); see also Thomas Aleinikoff ET AL., IMMIGRATION
& CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS & POLICY, 10 (5th ed. 2003) (emphasizing transmission of citizenship
only through U.S. citizen fathers).
" See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1952) (requiring citizen father to establish paternity prior to
illegitimate child's twenty-first birthday when born abroad); contra Citizenship and Naturalization
Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, 48 Stat. 797 (limiting transmission of citizenship based on married
United States citizen parent gender neutral). Specifically, the statute permits:
Any child hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose
father or mother or both at the time of the birth of such child is a citizen of the United
States, is declared to be a citizen of the United States; but the rights of citizenship shall
not descend to any such child unless the citizen father or citizen mother, as the case may
be, has resided in the United States previous to the birth of such child.
Citizenship and Naturalization Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, 48 Stat. 797; see also Wauchope v.
U.S. Dept. of State, 985 F.2d 1407, 1413, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1993) (referencing Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, 79 Stat. 911) ("The statute granted such status to the mothers of
illegitimate citizen or permanent lawful resident children, to the illegitimate children of citizen or
permanent lawful resident mothers, and to all parents and children of citizens or permanent
residents where the child were legitimate."). The First Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal
to allow the defendant in United States v. Guerrier the opportunity to present evidence of
citizenship because the defendant lacked evidence that his father satisfied the United States
residency requirement. See 428 F.3d 76, 80 (1st Cir. 2005). The Guerriercourt recognized that
without evidence that the appellant biological father satisfied the residency requirement only
applicable to determining whether a United States citizen father could transmit citizenship, the
appellants "derivative citizenship defense would necessarily fail." See Guerrier,428 F.3d at 80.
See generally LINDA K. KERBER, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES 43 (1998) ("At the

turn of the twenty-first century, traditional marriage relations continue to play a significant role in
the ability of citizens to transmit birthright citizenship to their children . . ..").
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American history, the statute regulating the transmission of United States
citizenship favored citizen fathers."6
A. Priorto 1934
Congress first addressed the issue of whether a child born abroad to
a United States citizen parent will obtain citizenship when enacting
immigration legislation in 1790, which included a separate clause requiring
fathers to affirmatively establish United States citizenship prior to the birth
of the foreign bom child.17 As legislation evolved, Congress imposed
restrictions on a United States citizen father's ability to transmit citizenship
to a child bom abroad while mothers were prevented from transmitting
citizenship to their children bom abroad entirely.' It was not until 1934 that

16 See Act of March 26, 1790, ch 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed January 29, 1795) ("That the right of
citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the United
States."); Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001) (recognizing § 1409(a) imposes
requirements on noncitizen mother are rarely asked of citizen mothers); Wauchope v. U.S. Dept.
of State, 985 F.2d 1407, 1412 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing Revised Statutes of 1874 provided right
to citizen men and not citizen women); see also Martha F. Davis, Sex Based Citizenship
Classificationsand the "New Rationality," 80 ALB. L. REV. 851, 853 (2016/2017) ("In the U.S.,
sex-based citizenship classifications have their origins in the U.S. Constitution itself, which from
its inception accepted different citizenship obligations and rights based on sex.").
17 See Act of March 26, 1790, ch 3, 1 Stat. 103 (granting foreign born children birth right
citizenship if fathers lived in the U.S.); see also Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 85 (1934)
(recognizing citizen father requirement at birth and "upon reaching the age of majority"); Weedin
v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 662, 666 (1927) (emphasizing status of father at time of birth dictates
transmission of citizenship); see also THOMAS ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP:
PROCESS & POLICY, 32 (5th ed. 2003) (recognizing interest in deterring expatriates from
transmitting citizenship indefinitely without contact with United States for generations); Martha F.
Davis, Sex-Based Citizenship Classifications and The "New Rationality", 80 ALB. L. REV. 851,
853 (2017) ("In the U.S., sex-based citizenship classifications have their origins in the U.S.
Constitution itself, which from its inception accepted different citizenship obligations and rights
based on sex.").
18 See Act of Congress April 14, 1802, 2 Stat. 153 (requiring citizen fathers physically reside
in U.S. before birth of foreign born to transmit citizenship). Specifically, the statute provided:

[Tihe children of persons who now are, or have been citizens of the United States, shall,
though born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, be considered as
citizens of the United States: Provided, that the right of citizenship shall not descend to
persons whose fathers have never resided within the United States.
Id.; Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 311 (1961) ("[R]ecogniz[ing] that until the 1934 Act the
transmission of citizenship to one born abroad was restricted to the child of a qualifying American
father, and withheld completely from the child of a United States citizen mother and an alien
father."); see also Martha F. Davis, Sex-Based Citizenship Classifications and the "New
Rationality", 80 ALB. L. REV. 851, 853 (2017) (highlighting 1907 requirement for United States
citizen women to relinquish citizenship upon marrying non-citizen); see also Linda K. Kerber, No
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there was an overarching shift in policy towards disfavoring American
citizen fathers.19

Despite attempting to address transmission of citizenship throughout
the nineteenth century, Congress only placed more restrictions on United
States citizenship descending from citizen fathers while completely ignoring
such transmission of citizenship from citizen mothers .20
The Court first addressed the issue of the gender distinction in
section 1409 which found that there was an important government interest
in the gender distinction. 2 1 The Court found the "biological differences
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES 44 (1998) (recognizing father's choice to legitimize
relationship determined whether foreign born child can claim United States citizenship).
19 See Miller, 523 U.S. at 466 (dissent, Ginsberg, J.) ("The 1940 Act preserved Congress'
earlier recognition of parental equality in regard to children born in wedlock, but established a
different regime for children born out of wedlock, one that disadvantaged United States citizen
fathers and their children."); Wauchope v. U.S. Dept. of State, 985 F.2d 1407, 1413-14, 1418 (9th
Cir. 1993) (recognizing preferential treatment of legitimate children of United States citizen fathers
unconstitutional); see also Linda K. Kerber, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To BE LADIES 43 (1998)
("[N]one of these statutes was retroactive, and an adult legitimately born abroad in 1933 or earlier
who wishes to claim birthright citizenship has had difficulty claiming it through a mother.").
20 See Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, 10 Stat. 604 (permitting jus sanguinis to foreign born
children of U.S. citizens). Specifically, the statute recognized that:
[Plersons heretofore born, or hereafter to be born, out of the limits and jurisdiction of
the United States, whose fathers were or shall be at the time of their birth citizens of the
United States, shall be deemed and considered and are hereby declared to be citizens of
the United States: Provided, however, That the rights of citizenship shall not descend to
persons whose fathers never resided in the United States.
Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, 10 Stat. 604; see also Act of April 1802, 2 Stat. 153 (preventing
transmission of birth-right citizenship when fathers lacked residency requirement); Rogers v.
Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 826 (1971) (recognizing that "[m]aternal citizenship afforded no benefit" until
1934); Breyer v. Meissner, 214 F.3d 416,418 (3rd Cir. 2000) (recognizing gender-based distinction
in transmission of citizenship foreign-born children to United States citizens).
21 See Miller, 523 U.S. at 421 (identifying two of governments important interests). The
majority reasoned that:
[E]nsuring reliable proof that a person born out of wedlock who claims citizenship by
birth actually shares a blood relationship with an American citizen; encouraging the
development of a healthy relationship between the citizen parent and the child while
child is a minor and fostering ties between child and United States.
Id. In Miller, the petitioner argued that the gender-based classifications used in § 1409(a)(4)
violated equal protection without justification. Id. at 423. The Court reasoned that the joint conduct
of a citizen and an alien that results in conception is not sufficient to produce an American citizen,
regardless of the gender of the citizen parent. Id. at 433. The majority emphasized that the
requirement for transmitting birth-right citizenship was to ensure that the blood ties between the
U.S. citizen and foreign-born child to encourage parent-child relationship. Id. at 434-36. The
majority rationalized that formal recognition of the relationship between the U.S. citizen parent and
the foreign-born child is required to establish the legal relationship between the two. Id. at 440.
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between single men and women provide a relevant basis for differing rules
governing their ability to confer citizenship on children born out of wedlock
in foreign land." 22 Despite the majority claiming the distinction was
"biological differences" and not generalizations, Justice Ginsburg argued the
distinction "fit and reinforce a stereotype or historic pattern" and further
noted that "mothers ... are responsible for a child born out of wedlock;
fathers unmarried to the child's mother, ordinarily, are not.""
B. The Balance Tilts with the NationalityAct of 1940
Congress made a significant shift in how they viewed children born
abroad with the Act of May 24, 1934. Wile this change only applied to
The paternity test was seen as reliable proof of a biological relationship between the citizen father
and the foreign-born child that was equivalent to the mother's presence at the birth of the foreignborn child. Id. at 445.
22 See Miller, 523 U.S. at 433 ("joint conduct of a citizen and an alien that result in conception
is not sufficient to produce an American citizen, regardless of the citizen parent gender."). Contra
Miller, 523 U.S. at 469 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing flaws in government's argument).
Justice Ginsburg specifically noted, "[e]ven if one accepts at face value the governments rationale
it is surely based on generalization (stereotypes) about the way women (or men) are." Id. "These
sex-based citizenship laws have persisted despite the heightened scrutiny that is now regularly
accorded laws that rely on overt sex-based classifications and sex stereotypes." Martha F. Davis,
Sex-Based Citizenship Classifications and the "New Rationality," 80 ALB. L. REV. 851, 854
(2017).
23 See Miller, 523 U.S. at 460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alleging statute is improperly
based
on traditional gender roles).
24 See Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, §1, 48 Stat. 797 (recognizing U.S. citizen
parents have
equal ability to transmit citizenship to children born abroad). Congress recognized the implication
that both parents had in transmitting citizenship in that:
Any child hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose
father or mother or both at the time of the birth of such child is a citizen of the United
States, is declared to be a citizen of the United States; but the rights of citizenship shall
not descend to any such child unless the citizen father or citizen mother, as the case may
be, has resided in the United States previous to the birth of such child. In cases where
one of the parents is an alien, the right of citizenship chall [sic] not descend unless the
child comes to the United States and resides there in for at least five years continuously
immediately previous to his eighteenth birthday, and unless, within six months after the
child's twenty-first birthday, he or she shall take an oath of allegiance to the United
States of America as prescribed by the Bureau of Naturalization.
Id. (emphasis added); Miller, 523 U.S. at 465 (1998) (Ginsburg, J. dissent) ("In 1934, Congress
moved in a new direction. It terminated the discrimination against United States citizen mothers in
regard to children born abroad."); Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 826 (1971) (establishing ability
of foreign born children to claim citizenship through U.S. citizen mothers). While the Act of May
24, 1934 only applied to married parents, it was the first time that Congress recognized a woman's
equal ability to transmit citizenship. See Martha F. Davis, Sex-Based Citizenship Classifications
and The "New Rationality", 80 ALB. L. REv. 851, 853-43 (2017).
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children born abroad to married parents, the Nationality Act of 1940
addressed the issue of children born to unmarried parents .25 For the first
time, the rules governing citizenship were more favorable to citizen mothers
and only required the mother to hold citizenship at the time of the child's
birth. 26 However, a citizen father would need to physically reside in the
United States prior to the birth of the child, and also legitimize the child
before recognizing birth-right citizenship. 27 Since the Nationality Act of
1940, Congress has made minor changes to the statute but the requirement
that citizen fathers must take affirmative steps to transmit citizenship to out
of wedlock foreign born children, while citizen mothers may transmit
citizenship through simply satisfying the resident requirement, still
persists .28 These subsequent revisions to the Nationality Act of 1940 shifted
some of the requirements, but did not alter "the fundamental sex-based
structure" which required different standards for "citizen fathers and citizen
mothers to extend derivative citizenship to their out-of-wedlock foreign born
children."29

C. How the Supreme Courthas InterpretedGender Distinction in the
25 See Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 205, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940) (establishing
illegitimate children born abroad to at least one citizen parent may acquire citizenship). Despite
the progress that was being made for the women's rights movement, the distinction between the
rights of citizen mothers and fathers persisted. See Martha F. Davis, Sex Based Citizenship
Classificationsand The "New Rationality", 80 ALB. L. REV. 851, 854 (2017). The equality that
was recognized in transmitting citizenship to foreign born children when the U.S. citizen was
married did not extend to situations where foreign born children were born abroad to one U.S.
parent that was not married. Id.
26 See Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 205, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940) (articulating
more leniency toward married citizen mothers). The Nationality Act of 1940 states the following:

In the absence of such legitimation or adjudication, the child, whether born before or
after the effective date of this Act, if the mother had the nationality of the United States
at the time of the child's birth, and had previously resided in the United States or one of
its outlying possessions, shall be held to have acquired at birth her nationality status.
Id.
27

See Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 82-414, §205, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940) (specifying

duration for residency requirement).
28 See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 76-853, § 309, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163
(effective June 27, 1952) (requiring establishment of paternity prior to acknowledging birth-right
citizenship); Immigration and Nationality Act of October 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-432,92 Stat.
1046 (repealing specific sections of Act); see also Martha F. Davis, Sex-Based Citizenship
Classificationsand the "New Rationality", 80 ALB L. REv. 851, 854 (2017) (articulating lack of
change in sex-based requirements).
29 See Martha F. Davis, Sex-Based Citizenship Classification and the "New Rationality", 80
ALB. L. REv. 851, 854-55 (2017) (emphasizing different gender-based standards for conveying
citizenship to foreign born child).
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Immigration Context
The United States Constitution prohibits the denial of "equal
protection of the laws" and the Supreme Court has invalidated laws when
they discriminate solely based on race and gender."o The Supreme Court has
recognized that the Equal Protection Doctrine and standards used to regulate
states under the Fourteenth Amendment are also applicable under the "equal
protection component" of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause for
the federal government.3 1 Prior to 1970s, the Court would uphold a statute
even if it promoted sexist stereotypes, so long as there was a rational basis
for the distinction.32 The Supreme Court has recognized certain situations
where such gender-based classifications may be upheld, such distinctions
must "serve important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory
means employed must be substantially related to achieve those objectives."33
The different components of the gender-based transmission of
birthright citizenship for a child born abroad to unwed parents has been

30 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (recognizing rights of citizens regardless of how
they
identify); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (dismissing claims of "separate but
equal" under law). The Supreme Court has recognized that both citizens and non-citizens are
protected by the U.S. Constitution while within U.S. jurisdiction. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
214 (1982); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE LJ. 545, 584 (1990)
(". undocumented aliens are entitled to constitutional protections . . . .").
31 See U.S. CONST. amend V (recognizing due process required for everyone); see also Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (recognizing Fifth Amendment "does not contain an equal
protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ."). While the federal government is not
bound by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment, discrimination does violate an
individuals right to due process. See Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499.
32 See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466-67 (1948) (upholding statute based on gender
distinctions). Contra Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976) (finding insufficient correlation
between state legal drinking age and gender distinction of state statute).
33 See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (requiring justification for
distinction and use of discriminatory means to achieve those objectives); U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 533 (1996) (establishing standard of exceedingly persuasive justification for gender
classifications). ContraBrown v. Bd. Of Educ., 347 U.S.483,492-93 (1954) (noting strict scrutiny
for racial distinctions); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001) (discussing Congress' decision to
add requirement for unmarried father's ability to convey citizenship for child).

Congress' decision to impose requirements on unmarried fathers that differ from those
on unmarried mothers is based on the significant difference between their respective
relationships to the potential citizen at the time of birth. Specifically, the imposition of
the requirement for a paternal relationship but not a maternal one, is justified by
important government objectives.
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62.
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challenged several times.3 However, even when the lower circuit courts of
appeals determined a portion of the statute violates equal protection, the
Supreme Court has overturned or the Court is unable to reach a majority on
appeal." The Supreme Court previously held the distinctions within the
statute are not based on a stereotype but on the physical differences between
the sexes .36 The Supreme Court has found different requirements for a
paternal relationship but not a maternal one, is justified by two important
government objectives: "(1) importance of assuring that a biological parentchild relationship exists; and (2) importance of ensuring relationship
37
between child and citizen parent and connection to the U.S.."

34 See, e.g., Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 93 (challenging residency requirement when paternity has
been acknowledged); Miller, 523 U.S. at 423 (challenging statutes on grounds of equal protection);
Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 658-60 (1927) (discussing paternal residency requirement).
3s Compare Lake v. Reno, 226 F.3d 141, 148 (2nd Cir. 2000) (recognizing paternity
requirement to confer citizenship violated equal protection), with Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73 (holding
gender distinction does not violate equal protection affirmative actions required by citizen father).
36 See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68 (claiming distinction is not "irrational or improper."). The Court
in Nguyen recognized the following:
§ 1409 addresses an undeniable difference in the circumstance of the parents at the time a child is
born, it should be noted, furthermore, that the difference does not result from some stereotype ....
the mother's knowledge of the child and the fact of parenthood have been established in a way not
guaranteed in the case of the unwed father.
Id. The Court found the sex-based distinction passed the heightened scrutiny analysis and the
distinction is appropriate given the situation. Id. The Court stated:
In the case of a citizen mother and a child born overseas, the opportunity for a meaningful
relationship between citizen parent and child inheres in the very event of birth, an event
so often critical to our constitutional and statutory understandings of citizenship. The
mother knows that the child is in being and is hers and has an initial point of contact with
him. There is at least an opportunity for mother and child to develop a real, meaningful
relationship. The same opportunity does not result from the event of birth, as a matter
of biological inevitability, in the case of the unwed father. Given the [nine]-month
interval between conception and birth, it is not always certain that a father will know that
a child was conceived, nor is it always clear that even the mother will be sure of the
father's identity.
Id. at 65. The Court also argued the gender-based distinction was appropriate given the impact it
would have on members of the armed forces. Id.; see also Martha F. Davis, Sex-Based Citizenship
Classificationsand the "New Rationality", 80 ALB. L. REv. 851, 861 (2017) ("According to the
majority, requiring U.S. fathers and their children seeking derivative citizenship to meet more
stringent standards is appropriate given these circumstances.").
37 See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62-68 (reasoning statute supported important government
objectives). The Court stated:
The imposition of a different set of rules for making [the] legal determination with
respect to fathers and mothers is neither surprising nor troublesome from a constitutional
perspective.... the use of gender specific terms takes into account a biological
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m. PREMISE OF THE PAPER
Luis Ramon Morales-Santana claimed that he was entitled to the
protection of United States citizenship on grounds that he acquired
citizenship from his father at birth.38 Morales-Santana was born in the
Dominican Republic to a Puerto Rican born father and Dominican mother.3 9
Morales-Santana's application to the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA)
was denied.4 At Morales-Santana's birth, the statute required that a citizen
father physically reside in the continental United States or territory for "at
least ten years, with at least five of those years occurring after the age of
fourteen" to be eligible to transmit birth-right citizenship to foreign born out
of wedlock children.4 ' However, a citizen mother had the ability to transmit
citizenship as long as she lived in the United States or United States territory
for at least one year prior to the birth of the child. 4 2 While Morales-Santana's
father left Puerto Rico twenty days before his nineteenth birthday, not
meeting the five year residency requirement, Morales-Santana prevailed in
difference between the parents. The differential treatment is inherent in a sensible
statutory scheme, given the unique relationship of the mother to the event of birth.
Id. at 63-64.
38 See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3724, at *9 (June 12,
2017) (explaining Morales-Santana's argument). "In 2000, Morales-Santana was placed in
removal proceedings after being convicted of "various felonies" to which he applied for
withholding of removal." See Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 521, 524 (2d Cir. 2015). If
Morales-Santana were able to establish that he did receive birthright citizenship, deportation
proceedings would be terminated, and therefore only face the consequences for his convictions. Id.
39 See Sessions, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3724, at *9 (describing basis of Morales-Santana's claims
to citizenship); 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (1917) (originally enacted as Act of Puerto Rico, ch. 145, §1402,
39 Stat. 951) (establishing U.S. citizenship for any individual born in Puerto Rico). MoralesSantana was born before Morales-Santana's parents marriage but his father acknowledged paternity
by adding his name to Morales-Santana's birth certificate. See Sessions, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3724, at
*13.
40 See Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 523 (finding Morales-Santana did not satisfy
requirements for derivative citizenship thus subject to deportation). Morales-Santana's father left
Puerto Rico just twenty days before he would have satisfied the residency requirement. See
Sessions, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3724, at *9. As a defense, Morales-Santana argued that he should not
be subject to removal proceedings on grounds that he obtained "derivative citizenship at birth via
his father." Morales-Santana,804 F.3d at 524. An immigration judge denied his withholding of
removal application and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) rejected his motion to reopen
"based on a violation of equal protection and newly obtained evidence relating to his father." Id. at
525.
41 See Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 527 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)) ("Because five of those
years must follow the father's fourteenth birthday, an unwed citizen father cannot transmit his
citizenship to his child born abroad to a non-citizen mother before the father's nineteenth
birthday.").
42 See id. (recognizing U.S. citizen mother may transmit citizenship if she moved from U.S.
after first birthday).
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his argument that the different physical presence requirement imposed on
unwed mothers and fathers violated equal protection.4 3
IV. ANALYSIS
A gender-based distinction may be upheld if there is an "exceedingly
persuasive justification for the distinction."" The government argued the
gender-based differences are justified because the statute avoids
statelessness while also ensuring a sufficient connection between the child
and the United States.4 5 A gender-based distinction "must serve actual and
important governmental objectives," while being "substantially related" to
the justification."4 6 The second circuit held that "neither interest is advanced
by the statute's gender-based physical presence requirement." 4 7 The lower
43 See id. at 523-25 (recognizing gender-based exception enacted by Congress for unwed
citizen mothers). As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized, and the Supreme Court
affirmed:

Morales-Santana's mother, rather than his father, [had] been a citizen continuously
present in Puerto Rico until 20 days prior to her nineteenth birthday, she would have
satisfied the requirements to confer derivative citizenship on her child. It is this genderbased difference in treatment that Morales-Santana claims violated his father's right to
equal protection.
Id. at 527.
4 See Miller, 523 U.S. at 482 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recognizing intermediate, heightened
scrutiny applied to evaluate distinctions based on gender).
45 See Sessions, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3724, at *26-28 (dismissing government's argument that
statute ensures connection). Additionally, the government argued that they only a "facially
legitimate and bona fide reason" is necessary for the designation included in the statute. See Brief
for Petitioner at 35, Lynch v. Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d 521 (2015) (No. 15-1191) (Aug. 19,2016).
46 See Sessions, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3724, at *18 (establishing level of scrutiny applied to
statute); Miller, 523 U.S. at 482 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing standard of review
applicable); Wauchope v. U.S. Dept. of State, 985 F.2d 1407, 1412 (1993) (quoting Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)) (establishing standard for evaluating equal
protection violation based on gender). The Court recognized the following:
[T]he party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their
gender must carry the burden of showing an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for
the classification . . . .The burden is met only by showing at least that the classification
serves "important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed"
are "substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."
Wauchope v. U.S. Dept. of State, 985 F.2d 1407, 1412 (1993) (quoting Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
47 See Sessions, 2017 U.S. LEXIS at *9-10 ("We hold that the gender line Congress drew is
incompatible with the requirement that the Government accord to all persons 'the equal protection
of the laws."'). Despite the government's efforts, both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded "neither interest is advanced by the statute's gender-based physical
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court appropriately applied heightened scrutiny in evaluating the distinction
based on gender in transmitting citizenship at birth.48
A. Governmental objectives
1. Statelessness
The government argues that they had an interest in preventing
statelessness and that the statute clearly defines what qualifies an individual
for United States citizenship.4 9 The government claims that the statute is
designed to allow citizenship to be conveyed without an affirmative act by
the mother to provide citizenship to a foreign-born child in a nation that only
recognizes citizenship through paternity."o Despite this circular argument,
the appeals court recognized statelessness as a valid government objective.51
However, statelessness is not a valid government objective to justify the
gender-based distinction present in the statute. 52
2. Sufficient Connection between child-to-father and father-toUnited States
The government argues that requiring the father to recognize a
foreign-born child is necessary to establish that a real relationship between
father and son exists, both genetically and emotionally.5 3 Establishing
paternity alone is considered insufficient to prevent transmission of

presence requirement." Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 528. While the Court upheld the appeals
court's decision finding the statute a violation of equal protection there is still a question regarding
the requirements for transmitting birthright citizenship to a foreign-born child to unwed parents.
See Sessions, 2017 U.S. LEXIS at *9-10. The Court recommended that the highest level of the
residency requirements apply to both U.S. citizen fathers and mothers but, Congress decides what
requirements apply. Id. at 37-38.
48 See Sessions, 2017 U.S. LEXIS at *18 (explaining level of scrutiny required).
49 See Sessions, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3724, at *28-29 (articulating government's motive to
prevent statelessness of foreign born children of unwed citizen mothers); see also Rogers v. Bellei,
401 U.S. 815, 842 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 73
(1873)) (recognizing importance of defining citizenship).
5o See Sessions, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3724, at *30 (rejecting government's argument that
statelessness equals valid risk).
51 See United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (identifying
statelessness as important interest).
52 See Sessions, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3724, at *30-31 (recognizing gender-based role of
guardianship as justification for statute).
53 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 67 (2001) (requiring parent have relationship with child
and not just share DNA).
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birthright citizenship. 54 The government argues foreign-born children must
demonstrate a stronger connection to the United States than just a blood
connection to an American father but being born of a citizen mother who has
spent only a year in the United States is sufficient.55 There are scenarios in
which an American father may not have met the residence requirement, like
Morales-Santana's father, but have maintained a close relationship with their
child, yet these men are still unable to convey citizenship to their foreignborn children because they have not satisfied the residential requirement
prior to the child's birth. 56
B. SubstantiallyRelated
The Supreme Court has established that distinctions between
genders may be permitted if it "advances the objectives in a manner
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause."5 The government argues that
the gender-based residency requirement is related to the government's
interest in preventing statelessness and fostering ties between the foreignborn child and the citizen parent as well as the connection to the United
States *58 The statute only allowed a U.S. citizen father to confer citizenship
to a foreign-born child born out of wedlock if the father was at least nineteen
years old. 59 The Court correctly emphasizes that the gender-based means
employed by the statute requirements do little to achieve the government's
objectives.'

C. PerpetuatingGender Discrimination,the "role" of a Mother
The statute distinguishes United States citizen parents who give birth
to child abroad out of wedlock based on their gender which violates the
54 See id. at 67 (cautioning risk of biological connection to citizen father with no relationship).
In Nguyen, the Supreme Court noted that a biological connection between the foreign-born child to
the unwed citizen father does not guarantee the citizen father knows of the child. Id.
55 See Sessions, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3724, at *27-28 (analyzing different residence standards for
unwed citizen mothers and fathers).
56 See id. at 28 (noting foreign born child of unwed citizen mother may claim citizenship
without relationship to mother).
57 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (defining rationally related objectives of statute).
58 See Sessions, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3724, at *26 (identifying government's argument that
distinction fosters connection to the United States).
59 See Morales-Santana,804 F.3d at 527 (noting children born to eighteen-year-old citizen
father cannot acquire birth-right citizenship).
60 See Sessions, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3724, at *27 (noting "the gender based means scarcely serve
the posited end.").
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Equal Protection Clause. 6 1 The Supreme Court has previously ruled that
allowing a gender distinction in transmitting birthright citizenship to a child
born abroad to unwed parents and only one U.S. citizen parent is permissible
and not a violation of Equal Protection because it is supported by important
government interests .62 As stated above, these interests are not important and
such ideology is founded upon impermissible stereotypes of gender roles.63
Additionally, the Court permitted the distinction to persist based on the
biological differences between men and women.M

" See 8 U.S.C. §1409(a)-(c) (applying gender-based distinctions); see also Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 77 (1971) ("By providing dissimilar treatment of men and women who are thus similarly
situated, the challenged section violates Equal Protection Clause.").
62 See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62 ("Congress' decision to impose requirements on unmarried
fathers that differ from those on unmarried mothers is based on the significant difference between
their respective relationships to the potential citizen at the time of birth. Specifically, the imposition
of the requirement for a paternal relationship, but not a maternal one, is justified by two important
governmental objectives.").
63 See Miller, 523 U.S. at 433-34 (suggesting U.S. citizen mothers make choice whereas citizen
father may not be involved); see also Martha F. Davis, Sex-Based Citizenship Classificationsand
the "New Rationality", 80 ALB. L. REv. 851, 871 (2016/2017) (citing Kristin A. Collins,
Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and
Nation, 123 YALE LJ. 2134, 2136-37 (2014)) ("[Iln the laws at issue in Miller, Nguyen, FloresVillar, and Morales-Santana, women and men are treated differently because of long-accepted
norms of family structure and parental roles that were not questioned by the laws' drafters but that
would be unacceptable today.").
6 See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 61 (emphasizing citizen mother, but not father, has option to have
baby in U.S. or abroad). Specifically, the Court in Nguyen states:
[A] citizen mother expecting a child and living abroad has the right to re-enter the United
States so the child can be born here and be a 14th Amendment citizen. From one
perspective, then, the statute simply ensures equivalence between two expectant mothers
who are citizens abroad if one chooses to reenter for the child's birth and the other
chooses not to return, or does not have the means to do so. This equivalence is not a
factor if the single citizen parent living abroad is the father. For, unlike the unmarried
mother, the unmarried father as a general rule cannot control where the child will be
born.
Id. The Court in Nguyen also reasoned that fathers were required to take additional steps to
establish relationship with a child because the relationship between child and mother can be
established at birth itself while the father does not have to be present. Id. at 62. The fathers presence
at the child's birth does not necessarily mean that he is the father. Id. See also, Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248, 251 (1983) (adopting different standards for notifying mother of adoption than
fathers for children out of wedlock); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) ("The mother carries and bears the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is
clear. The validity of the father's parental claims must be gauged by other measures.").

282

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XXIII

D. Influence of the military on statute and the Courtsjudgments
The actions of the U.S. military have historically shaped statutes
enacted by Congress.6 5 In Miller, the Court recognized that the presence of
the military throughout the world impacted the facts of the case as well as on
the statute governing birthright citizenship.6 6 The Court recognized the
impact of having a large number of U.S. citizens enter a foreign country and
return to the U.S. by virtue of their military service created a legitimate
concern for Congress.6 ' Essentially, Congress is concerned about the risk of
having male citizens enter a foreign country and potentially create attenuated
ties to the United States.68 However, this concern does not extend to female
United States citizens. 69
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's, latest ruling indicates a shift in the Courts
approach to Equal Protection in the immigration context, as they would to
any other equal protection issue. The Courts most recent ruling is an
indication that progress is being made, and immigration is catching up with
modern times in recognizing the government objectives for gender-based

65 See U.S. Const. amend. XXVI, § 1 (stating voting age lowered to eighteen); Exec. Order No.
9066, 54 Fed. Reg. 25291 (order authorizing the relocation of persons of Japanese ancestry as a
response to Pearl Harbor); see also Elizabeth Aloi, Note, Thirty-Five Years After the 26th
Amendment And Still Disenfranchised:CurrentControversiesIn Student Voting, 18 NAT'L BLACK
L.J. 283, 285 (2004) (recognizing impact of Vietnam War on lowering voting age).
66 See Miller, 523 U.S. at 439 (citation omitted) ("In 1970, when petitioner was born, about
683,000 service personnel were stationed in the Far East, 24,000 of whom were in the
Philippines.").
67 See Miller, 523 U.S. at 439 ("Congress had legitimate concerns about a class of children
born abroad out of wedlock to alien mothers and to American servicemen who would not
necessarily know about, or be known by, their children.").
68 See Miller, 523 U.S. at 439 (recognizing reasonableness of birthright citizenship for children
of unwed parents to relationship with citizen parent). The Court noted:

It was surely reasonable when the INA was enacted in 1952, and remains equally
reasonable today, for Congress to condition the award of citizenship to such children on
an act that demonstrates, at a minimum, the possibility that those who become citizens
will develop ties with this country-a requirement that performs a meaningful purpose
for citizen fathers but normally would be superfluous for citizen mothers.
Id.
See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65 (identifying young men as justification for statute). The Court
noted "[o]ne concern in this context has always been with young people, men for the most part,
who are on duty with the Armed Forces in foreign countries." Id.
69
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distinctions as unconstitutional. However, the Court's ruling has also created
an uncertainty in the laws governing birthright citizenship.
The statute that exists at the time of birth dictates which birthright
citizen statutes apply. Now that the Supreme Court has identified the genderbased distinctions established in § 1409 as unconstitutional, it is unclear what
standard should be applied. The Supreme Court suggests in MoralesSantana that when a child is born out of wedlock to only one citizen parent,
the citizen parent satisfy the minimum residency requirement regardless of
which parent holds the citizenship.
The Supreme Court further
recommended that the longer of the residency requirements in the current
legislation be applied. Additionally, the Court failed to specify whether this
ruling is retroactive. While in theory the Supreme Court's ruling in MoralesSantana is beneficial, it is unclear whether Richard can benefit from this
ruling.
Samantha Gallardo

